Part I
1. What was the origin of the name "Sherman"?
Most modellers and wargamers know that the US Army didn't use the name "Sherman" for the M4 during WW2. It doesn't appear in official US documents, and wasn't used by the troops - they referred to it simply as the "M4" or just as a "medium". The name was only used (unofficially) by a few US soldiers who'd been in contact with the British and knew they used it. For instance, in a widely publicised letter to the Deputy Chief of Staff in March 1945, General Patton referred to both the "M5 (light, Stuart)" and "M4 (medium, Sherman)". The Germans did use the name "Sherman" in official reports.
The name "Sherman" was adopted by the British following a request by Winston Churchill, who found the use of letters and numbers for tanks confusing (especially when the Americans had both an M3 light tank and an M3 medium tank). He may have personally chosen the name Sherman (as well as "Stuart", "Lee" and Grant") - there is something Churchillian about naming tanks after famous Civil War generals. However, contrary to some accounts, the British did not use the name "General Sherman"; in fact, Churchill specifically said that the term "General" shouldn't be used. M4s began to be referred to generally as Shermans in the US after the war, mostly as a result of usage of the name by the US press.
Incidentally, the only official US Army tank names in WW2 appear to have been "Hellcat" (invented by Buick) and "Chaffee" (the first tank given a name by the War Department). There is no official use of the name "Wolverine" in the context of the M10, and apparently the name "Jackson" was invented by Tamiya when they released their M36 kit.
2. Did Shermans burn more easily than other tanks?
Shermans are often described as having a propensity for burning easily when hit. There was definitely a belief amongst troops that this was the case, particularly during the Normandy campaign. There are numerous accounts which mention this tendency, including a well-known autobiography by a US tanker from 3rd Armored Division called "Death Traps". The Sherman acquired nicknames like "Ronson" (because it "lights every time", as per the slogan for the cigarette lighter) and "Tommy Cooker" (named after a WWI trench stove). Most modellers and wargamers know that this was not due to the fact that the majority of Shermans ran on gasoline rather than diesel fuel, but because of ammunition propellant igniting when the tank was penetrated. This kind of fire started very quickly, giving the crew little time to escape. 80-90% of tank fires resulted from ammunition, and the British ascertained that this was primarily due to the poor positioning of the hull ammunition, which was stored in the sponsons. It was also partly due to crews stowing ammunition loose in the tank, a common practice amongst US crews in particular (apparently fires were less frequent in British Guards units, which had stricter ammunition stowage discipline). The Sherman's reputation for burning more easily than other tanks was therefore to some extent undeserved.
Ultimately, the main reason why Shermans burned is because their armour was inadequate against German weapons like the commonly encountered 7.5cm Pak 40 and the Panther's 7.5cm KwK 42. A hit from one of these weapons had a high chance of penetrating the Sherman, and this would trigger an ammunition fire. German tanks were equally prone to burning - the Panther also had ammunition stowed in its sponsons, and was prone to catastrophic ammunition fires when penetrated in its (thinner) side armour. However, German tanks were generally harder to penetrate (partly because of the inferior anti-armour performance of the Sherman's 75mm gun). It is also worth bearing in mind that the Allies were the attackers, and that in addition to Panzers they faced large numbers of well-sited anti-tank guns and hand-held anti-tank weapons, which took a high toll of the Shermans. Whenever the Germans mounted their own offensive operations, their tanks proved equally vulnerable to Allied anti-tank weapons - and to their own unreliability.
Prior to the introduction of 'wet' stowage (see below), the solution was to weld armoured panels (known as appliqué armour) onto the hull sides. This was done in the factory (either during production or as part of subsequent remanufacturing), although a large number of Shermans were modified in the UK prior to D-Day. A curved panel was also welded over the right cheek, which had a thin spot in order to accommodate the power traverse gear until the turret was modified to incorporate a 'bulge' so that the armour thickness remained uniform. Sherman crews also welded or hung spare track links over their tanks' vulnerable areas, although this practice did not become widespread until late 1944. The problem was never really solved, and the Sherman's armour remained its main weakness even when its firepower and mobility were upgraded.
3. What was 'wet' stowage and did it work?
'Wet' stowage involved relocating the ammunition stowage from the sponsons to water-protected armoured bins below the turret. Over 35 gallons of water was required, and it was treated with ethylene glycol to prevent it freezing in cold weather. To make room for this modification, and allow access to the relocated ammunition bins, most of the floor of the turret basket was removed (this meant that the loader walked on the top of the ammo stowage when the turret was rotated; there was still a partial floor under the gunner and commander). This modification was made as part of the program for designing the 'Ultimate' Sherman, which began in July 1943. This also involved the redesign of the hull, with a one-piece 47 degree glacis and larger hatches for the driver and co-driver. On the late M4A1 this was accomplished with a new cast hull design, while the late M4 had a cast front hull and a welded rear (hence the US designation "M4 Composite", or the British "Sherman Hybrid"). Other improvements included the 'sharp nosed' transmission housing and better seats for the crew. When the 76mm turret was introduced, appropriate 'wet' stowage for the 76mm gun was incorporated. Shermans with 'wet' stowage had the suffix 'W' added after their designation. 105mm-armed Shermans did not have 'wet' stowage, and nor did the late production M4A2 (75mm).
Opinion on the effectiveness of 'wet' stowage was divided. There was a significant reduction in tank fires - according to some studies, fires were reduced to less than 20%. However, there was a strong belief that this was mostly due to the repositioning of the ammunition below the level of the sponsons rather than any real benefit from the addition of water. 'Wet' stowage was abandoned after WW2.
4. Did it really take 3 Shermans to knock out a Panther or Tiger?
This statement is frequently made (sometimes the ratio is said to be 5:1 or even 6:1), and it is claimed that this was officially acknowledged at the time. It is also frequently stated that it was Allied policy to accept this ratio, on the basis that Shermans were easily replaced, while Panzers weren't. Many histories refer to the practice of using the Sherman's speed and fast turret traverse to outmanoeuvre Panthers and Tigers in order to get a flank or rear shot, but that in the process it was normal to lose several Shermans.
So was it true? The short answer to the question is "yes, but not always". But the long answer is more complex. For a start, it's important to eliminate the Sherman Firefly from the equation, because Fireflies were demonstrably capable of knocking out a Panther or Tiger themselves (provided they got the first shot - an important qualification).
The Sherman's shortcomings only seem to have become a cause for serious concern during the Normandy campaign. The British were more aware of the increasing armour and firepower of German armour than the Americans, having taken significant losses to the improved Panzer IV and Tiger in the Italian campaign. This led them to try and mount a 17-pdr in a tank, which eventually resulted in the Firefly. But it was not a straightforward process mounting such a large gun in a modest sized tank, and they were hamstrung by a shortage of suitable Shermans. Meanwhile, most British tank crews would have to make do with the standard Sherman (or, in the case of a couple of formations, the new Cromwell).
The standard Sherman had performed well in British service in 1942-1943, and was well liked (in part because it was such an enormous improvement on the British tanks which it replaced). Its 75mm gun fired a very effective high explosive shell, which was very useful against infantry (and anti-tank guns), and its AP shell was still reasonably effective against the most common Panzers (principally the Panzer III and Panzer IV). But in Normandy the Sherman proved a disappointment, and the crews soon began to lose faith in it. Its 75mm shells bounced off the Panther's front armour, and its own armour could be penetrated relatively easily by virtually every German tank and anti-tank gun. Even the Panzer IV, which was in many ways inferior to the Sherman, had a superior main gun - its 75mm gun would almost always penetrate the Sherman's amour if a hit was scored. British Sherman crews suffered high losses, and morale was shaken. When a large armoured force from 7th Armoured Division (consisting primarily of Cromwells and half-tracks) was wiped out by a handful of Tigers at Villers-Bocage, the finger-pointing began. The British press reported: "Our Shermans, with special 17-pounder guns, are fine tanks. They can match the Germans' best in fire power but not in thickness of armour. But our ordinary Shermans are inferior to Tigers and Panthers. Roughly, out of every 20 German tanks we destroy, nine are Mark IVs, eight are Panthers and three are Tigers." The regimental history of the Irish Guards recorded that "...the problem was that only one Sherman in every four was equipped with a 17 pounder gun and that Allies defeated the Germans in Normandy only because they could afford to lose 6 tanks to every German tank." A report on tanks losses from 6 June to 10 July recorded that, of 45 Sherman hulks inspected, 40 had been penetrated by 75mm or 88mm shells, of which 33 had caught fire. Out of 65 hits by AP shells, 63 penetrated the tank completely.
The high tank losses can be attributed to a number of factors apart from the Sherman's inherent shortcomings. The terrain in Normandy greatly favoured the defenders, and enabled the German tanks to ambush the oncoming Shermans. The Cromwell was equally vulnerable, as was demonstrated at Villers-Bocage. There was little room to manoeuvre, and a single knocked out tank could block an entire advance. British tactics were also flawed. But the fingers were pointed at the failings of Allied tanks (and particularly the Sherman), as a string of critical reports found their way back to the British Government. General Montgomery was so concerned about the effect of this on morale that he expressly forbade further liaison reports. He said publicly: "We have nothing to fear from the Panther or Tiger tanks; they are unreliable mechanically, and the Panther is very vulnerable from the flank...Provided our tactics are good, we can defeat them without difficulty." Even allowing for concerns about morale, his comments seem to betray an almost wilful ignorance of technical issues that was common amongst senior Allied commanders. Churchill himself had to defend the quality of Allied tanks in parliament, but the response from an MP was to quote a British squadron commander: "I know what happens, because it happened to me twice. My squadron goes over and bumps into one of these Tigers. There are four bangs and there are four of my tanks gone."
The terrain beyond Caen was far more open, and the heavy losses during Operation Goodwood (which prompted the biggest crisis in confidence in the quality of the Sherman, and led to the exchanges quoted above) were the result of additional factors. The British mishandled their armour, relying on massed assaults through narrow corridors with inadequate infantry support. This was in part due to a growing a shortage of infantry (the rationale being that tanks could always be replaced), but also due to ongoing problems getting British tanks and infantry to cooperate properly. And the British tanks' main enemy was German anti-tanks guns, including several well-sited 88m guns. British tank losses during Goodwood have been exaggerated (it wasn't 500, but closer to 275, and the losses were made good quite quickly). But the gains were minimal considering the cost, and the operation failed to achieve its objectives. Arguably, however, it would not have gone much better with more effective tanks - the Germans had encountered very similar problems advancing against well-prepared Soviet defences during Operation Zitadelle a year before.
The US Army had a similar experience to the British. Eisenhower's senior officers (including Patton, supposedly an expert on armoured warfare) had rejected the 76mm armed Sherman when it was demonstrated to them shortly after D-Day. This reflected a common complacency about the ability of the 75mm-armed Sherman to deal with German armour (there was also objections to the 76mm's poor high explosive shell and the amount of dust and smoke when it was fired). US tankers developed tactics which used the Sherman's advantages to overcome German tanks. In addition to using some tanks as decoys while others flanked the target and engaged its side armour, US tankers would fire smoke shells to blind the Germans, or plaster the German tank with fire so that the crew abandoned it. Tank losses were heavy, but the issue did not generate the same level of publicity as it did with the British.
The 75mm's poor performance led to a rush to bring the 76mm into service (see below), but it proved disappointing - when Eisenhower witnessed a demonstration against Panther hulks he commented bitterly that "you can't knock out a damn thing with it". Even with the 76mm, the Sherman remained outgunned by the German tanks, and the problem was not resolved before the end of the Normandy fighting. The declining quality of Panzer crew training, and the unreliability of tanks like the Panther (coupled increasing fuel shortages) helped to close the gap. It is worth bearing in mind that by the time the US Army was fully engaged against the Germans, it was in open country beyond the bocage. By this time, a large proportion of the best German armoured units had been ground down by the British and Canadians, and the German tanks were often mishandled, so they presented a much reduced threat. The German practice of equipping newly-raised units with new vehicles, instead of replacing losses sustained by veteran units, exacerbated this problem. After the Normandy campaign, American tank crews were, on the whole better trained and more experienced than German crews, and US armoured units evolved highly effective combined arms tactics that largely neutralised any technical superiority the Panzers retained.
The Sherman's deficiencies were less important during the great drive towards the German border. The proliferation of Panzerfausts did lead to the increasing use of spare track links and sandbags as protection (see below), but these kinds of hand-held weapons were a threat to tanks on both sides. In fact, as historians like Steve Zaologa have pointed out, only a tank as reliable and easily maintained as the Sherman was capable of maintaining the rapid rates of advance which were achieved by the Allies at that time (Patton made the same argument in defence of the Sherman in 1945). Arguably, the Sherman was doing exactly what it was intended for - exploiting a breakthrough rather than engaging enemy armour. During this time, there was a reluctance to hold up Sherman deliveries by cancelling the production of 75mm tanks, so the number of 76mm-armed Shermans remained relatively low.
As German resistance stiffened in late 1944, Sherman crews began to face more Panzers. The Sherman's vulnerability was again highlighted, and this time the problem escalated. Increasing US tank losses in the run-up to the Ardennes Offensive prompted critical reports in the press, including an article in the Chicago Daily News in which an unidentified soldier observed "We knew we were licked tank for tank, but the boys went in a free-for-all, ganging up on the Tiger until they knocked him out". The Armored News reported "American tanks cannot beat Germans in open combat. The Panther and Tiger armor will repel our tank gun shells while their 75 and 88mm guns will shoot straight through our best armor." It was at this time that the "3:1" ratio began to be referred to in the press. American tankers began demanding a tank with a 90mm gun, but all that was available was the M36 Tank Destroyer, which was entering service at that time.
Tank losses during the Ardennes Offensive were heavy. The large number of 75mm-armed Shermans were again at a disadvantage against German armour (a significant proportion of which now consisted of heavily-armed self-propelled guns). These losses were difficult to make good as there was a shortage of replacement tanks. In January 1945, Hanson Baldwin (a very influential journalist who specialised in military matters) ran a series of articles in the New York Times highlighting the Sherman's inferiority to German armour. In March 1945 no less a personage than General Patton responded. He claimed that American units had knocked out twice as many enemy tanks as they had lost, and was highly critical of German armour. While he ignored many of the real issues (such as the Sherman's poor anti-tank capability), he made some good arguments in favour of the Sherman's reliability and availability. Behind the scenes, he had been aware of the Sherman's shortcomings - in particular its thin armour (in 1945 he authorised the up-armouring of 3rd Army Shermans by cannibalising wrecked vehicles). However, as with Montgomery in 1944, he felt he had to defend the quality of American equipment in order to maintain morale.
In summary, the Sherman's thin armour and mediocre anti-tank capability were major disadvantages, and the 75mm Sherman was not well suited to the brutal slugging matches of the Normandy campaign. However, it performed well in other situations, and it should always be remembered that Allied tankers were well supported by air power and artillery, which gave them a significant edge at an operational level. German tanks proved almost equally vulnerable as the Sherman when used in an offensive role against well-prepared Allied forces, and normally lacked anything like the level of support enjoyed by the Allied tanks. However, when facing a Panzer (or a Panzerjaeger) with a well trained crew, the Sherman was at a significant disadvantage. In close terrain it was highly vulnerable to the powerful German anti-tank weapons, and in open terrain its thin armour was vulnerable to long-range German guns. In these situations, it was common to lose several Shermans (either destroyed or disabled) in the course of knocking out a smaller number of Panzers. It was in these situations that experience and training (as well as numbers) could tip the balance.
Note: many of the statistics and quotes in question 4 come from "The Armored Campaign in Normandy" by Stephen Napier.
