Rubicon Models
Rubicon Models => General Discussions => Topic started by: Pinky on April 10, 2016, 02:02:28 pm
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Part I
1. What was the origin of the name "Sherman"?
Most modellers and wargamers know that the US Army didn't use the name "Sherman" for the M4 during WW2. It doesn't appear in official US documents, and wasn't used by the troops - they referred to it simply as the "M4" or just as a "medium". The name was only used (unofficially) by a few US soldiers who'd been in contact with the British and knew they used it. For instance, in a widely publicised letter to the Deputy Chief of Staff in March 1945, General Patton referred to both the "M5 (light, Stuart)" and "M4 (medium, Sherman)". The Germans did use the name "Sherman" in official reports.
The name "Sherman" was adopted by the British following a request by Winston Churchill, who found the use of letters and numbers for tanks confusing (especially when the Americans had both an M3 light tank and an M3 medium tank). He may have personally chosen the name Sherman (as well as "Stuart", "Lee" and Grant") - there is something Churchillian about naming tanks after famous Civil War generals. However, contrary to some accounts, the British did not use the name "General Sherman"; in fact, Churchill specifically said that the term "General" shouldn't be used. M4s began to be referred to generally as Shermans in the US after the war, mostly as a result of usage of the name by the US press.
Incidentally, the only official US Army tank names in WW2 appear to have been "Hellcat" (invented by Buick) and "Chaffee" (the first tank given a name by the War Department). There is no official use of the name "Wolverine" in the context of the M10, and apparently the name "Jackson" was invented by Tamiya when they released their M36 kit.
2. Did Shermans burn more easily than other tanks?
Shermans are often described as having a propensity for burning easily when hit. There was definitely a belief amongst troops that this was the case, particularly during the Normandy campaign. There are numerous accounts which mention this tendency, including a well-known autobiography by a US tanker from 3rd Armored Division called "Death Traps". The Sherman acquired nicknames like "Ronson" (because it "lights every time", as per the slogan for the cigarette lighter) and "Tommy Cooker" (named after a WWI trench stove). Most modellers and wargamers know that this was not due to the fact that the majority of Shermans ran on gasoline rather than diesel fuel, but because of ammunition propellant igniting when the tank was penetrated. This kind of fire started very quickly, giving the crew little time to escape. 80-90% of tank fires resulted from ammunition, and the British ascertained that this was primarily due to the poor positioning of the hull ammunition, which was stored in the sponsons. It was also partly due to crews stowing ammunition loose in the tank, a common practice amongst US crews in particular (apparently fires were less frequent in British Guards units, which had stricter ammunition stowage discipline). The Sherman's reputation for burning more easily than other tanks was therefore to some extent undeserved.
Ultimately, the main reason why Shermans burned is because their armour was inadequate against German weapons like the commonly encountered 7.5cm Pak 40 and the Panther's 7.5cm KwK 42. A hit from one of these weapons had a high chance of penetrating the Sherman, and this would trigger an ammunition fire. German tanks were equally prone to burning - the Panther also had ammunition stowed in its sponsons, and was prone to catastrophic ammunition fires when penetrated in its (thinner) side armour. However, German tanks were generally harder to penetrate (partly because of the inferior anti-armour performance of the Sherman's 75mm gun). It is also worth bearing in mind that the Allies were the attackers, and that in addition to Panzers they faced large numbers of well-sited anti-tank guns and hand-held anti-tank weapons, which took a high toll of the Shermans. Whenever the Germans mounted their own offensive operations, their tanks proved equally vulnerable to Allied anti-tank weapons - and to their own unreliability.
Prior to the introduction of 'wet' stowage (see below), the solution was to weld armoured panels (known as appliqué armour) onto the hull sides. This was done in the factory (either during production or as part of subsequent remanufacturing), although a large number of Shermans were modified in the UK prior to D-Day. A curved panel was also welded over the right cheek, which had a thin spot in order to accommodate the power traverse gear until the turret was modified to incorporate a 'bulge' so that the armour thickness remained uniform. Sherman crews also welded or hung spare track links over their tanks' vulnerable areas, although this practice did not become widespread until late 1944. The problem was never really solved, and the Sherman's armour remained its main weakness even when its firepower and mobility were upgraded.
3. What was 'wet' stowage and did it work?
'Wet' stowage involved relocating the ammunition stowage from the sponsons to water-protected armoured bins below the turret. Over 35 gallons of water was required, and it was treated with ethylene glycol to prevent it freezing in cold weather. To make room for this modification, and allow access to the relocated ammunition bins, most of the floor of the turret basket was removed (this meant that the loader walked on the top of the ammo stowage when the turret was rotated; there was still a partial floor under the gunner and commander). This modification was made as part of the program for designing the 'Ultimate' Sherman, which began in July 1943. This also involved the redesign of the hull, with a one-piece 47 degree glacis and larger hatches for the driver and co-driver. On the late M4A1 this was accomplished with a new cast hull design, while the late M4 had a cast front hull and a welded rear (hence the US designation "M4 Composite", or the British "Sherman Hybrid"). Other improvements included the 'sharp nosed' transmission housing and better seats for the crew. When the 76mm turret was introduced, appropriate 'wet' stowage for the 76mm gun was incorporated. Shermans with 'wet' stowage had the suffix 'W' added after their designation. 105mm-armed Shermans did not have 'wet' stowage, and nor did the late production M4A2 (75mm).
Opinion on the effectiveness of 'wet' stowage was divided. There was a significant reduction in tank fires - according to some studies, fires were reduced to less than 20%. However, there was a strong belief that this was mostly due to the repositioning of the ammunition below the level of the sponsons rather than any real benefit from the addition of water. 'Wet' stowage was abandoned after WW2.
4. Did it really take 3 Shermans to knock out a Panther or Tiger?
This statement is frequently made (sometimes the ratio is said to be 5:1 or even 6:1), and it is claimed that this was officially acknowledged at the time. It is also frequently stated that it was Allied policy to accept this ratio, on the basis that Shermans were easily replaced, while Panzers weren't. Many histories refer to the practice of using the Sherman's speed and fast turret traverse to outmanoeuvre Panthers and Tigers in order to get a flank or rear shot, but that in the process it was normal to lose several Shermans.
So was it true? The short answer to the question is "yes, but not always". But the long answer is more complex. For a start, it's important to eliminate the Sherman Firefly from the equation, because Fireflies were demonstrably capable of knocking out a Panther or Tiger themselves (provided they got the first shot - an important qualification).
The Sherman's shortcomings only seem to have become a cause for serious concern during the Normandy campaign. The British were more aware of the increasing armour and firepower of German armour than the Americans, having taken significant losses to the improved Panzer IV and Tiger in the Italian campaign. This led them to try and mount a 17-pdr in a tank, which eventually resulted in the Firefly. But it was not a straightforward process mounting such a large gun in a modest sized tank, and they were hamstrung by a shortage of suitable Shermans. Meanwhile, most British tank crews would have to make do with the standard Sherman (or, in the case of a couple of formations, the new Cromwell).
The standard Sherman had performed well in British service in 1942-1943, and was well liked (in part because it was such an enormous improvement on the British tanks which it replaced). Its 75mm gun fired a very effective high explosive shell, which was very useful against infantry (and anti-tank guns), and its AP shell was still reasonably effective against the most common Panzers (principally the Panzer III and Panzer IV). But in Normandy the Sherman proved a disappointment, and the crews soon began to lose faith in it. Its 75mm shells bounced off the Panther's front armour, and its own armour could be penetrated relatively easily by virtually every German tank and anti-tank gun. Even the Panzer IV, which was in many ways inferior to the Sherman, had a superior main gun - its 75mm gun would almost always penetrate the Sherman's amour if a hit was scored. British Sherman crews suffered high losses, and morale was shaken. When a large armoured force from 7th Armoured Division (consisting primarily of Cromwells and half-tracks) was wiped out by a handful of Tigers at Villers-Bocage, the finger-pointing began. The British press reported: "Our Shermans, with special 17-pounder guns, are fine tanks. They can match the Germans' best in fire power but not in thickness of armour. But our ordinary Shermans are inferior to Tigers and Panthers. Roughly, out of every 20 German tanks we destroy, nine are Mark IVs, eight are Panthers and three are Tigers." The regimental history of the Irish Guards recorded that "...the problem was that only one Sherman in every four was equipped with a 17 pounder gun and that Allies defeated the Germans in Normandy only because they could afford to lose 6 tanks to every German tank." A report on tanks losses from 6 June to 10 July recorded that, of 45 Sherman hulks inspected, 40 had been penetrated by 75mm or 88mm shells, of which 33 had caught fire. Out of 65 hits by AP shells, 63 penetrated the tank completely.
The high tank losses can be attributed to a number of factors apart from the Sherman's inherent shortcomings. The terrain in Normandy greatly favoured the defenders, and enabled the German tanks to ambush the oncoming Shermans. The Cromwell was equally vulnerable, as was demonstrated at Villers-Bocage. There was little room to manoeuvre, and a single knocked out tank could block an entire advance. British tactics were also flawed. But the fingers were pointed at the failings of Allied tanks (and particularly the Sherman), as a string of critical reports found their way back to the British Government. General Montgomery was so concerned about the effect of this on morale that he expressly forbade further liaison reports. He said publicly: "We have nothing to fear from the Panther or Tiger tanks; they are unreliable mechanically, and the Panther is very vulnerable from the flank...Provided our tactics are good, we can defeat them without difficulty." Even allowing for concerns about morale, his comments seem to betray an almost wilful ignorance of technical issues that was common amongst senior Allied commanders. Churchill himself had to defend the quality of Allied tanks in parliament, but the response from an MP was to quote a British squadron commander: "I know what happens, because it happened to me twice. My squadron goes over and bumps into one of these Tigers. There are four bangs and there are four of my tanks gone."
The terrain beyond Caen was far more open, and the heavy losses during Operation Goodwood (which prompted the biggest crisis in confidence in the quality of the Sherman, and led to the exchanges quoted above) were the result of additional factors. The British mishandled their armour, relying on massed assaults through narrow corridors with inadequate infantry support. This was in part due to a growing a shortage of infantry (the rationale being that tanks could always be replaced), but also due to ongoing problems getting British tanks and infantry to cooperate properly. And the British tanks' main enemy was German anti-tanks guns, including several well-sited 88m guns. British tank losses during Goodwood have been exaggerated (it wasn't 500, but closer to 275, and the losses were made good quite quickly). But the gains were minimal considering the cost, and the operation failed to achieve its objectives. Arguably, however, it would not have gone much better with more effective tanks - the Germans had encountered very similar problems advancing against well-prepared Soviet defences during Operation Zitadelle a year before.
The US Army had a similar experience to the British. Eisenhower's senior officers (including Patton, supposedly an expert on armoured warfare) had rejected the 76mm armed Sherman when it was demonstrated to them shortly after D-Day. This reflected a common complacency about the ability of the 75mm-armed Sherman to deal with German armour (there was also objections to the 76mm's poor high explosive shell and the amount of dust and smoke when it was fired). US tankers developed tactics which used the Sherman's advantages to overcome German tanks. In addition to using some tanks as decoys while others flanked the target and engaged its side armour, US tankers would fire smoke shells to blind the Germans, or plaster the German tank with fire so that the crew abandoned it. Tank losses were heavy, but the issue did not generate the same level of publicity as it did with the British.
The 75mm's poor performance led to a rush to bring the 76mm into service (see below), but it proved disappointing - when Eisenhower witnessed a demonstration against Panther hulks he commented bitterly that "you can't knock out a damn thing with it". Even with the 76mm, the Sherman remained outgunned by the German tanks, and the problem was not resolved before the end of the Normandy fighting. The declining quality of Panzer crew training, and the unreliability of tanks like the Panther (coupled increasing fuel shortages) helped to close the gap. It is worth bearing in mind that by the time the US Army was fully engaged against the Germans, it was in open country beyond the bocage. By this time, a large proportion of the best German armoured units had been ground down by the British and Canadians, and the German tanks were often mishandled, so they presented a much reduced threat. The German practice of equipping newly-raised units with new vehicles, instead of replacing losses sustained by veteran units, exacerbated this problem. After the Normandy campaign, American tank crews were, on the whole better trained and more experienced than German crews, and US armoured units evolved highly effective combined arms tactics that largely neutralised any technical superiority the Panzers retained.
The Sherman's deficiencies were less important during the great drive towards the German border. The proliferation of Panzerfausts did lead to the increasing use of spare track links and sandbags as protection (see below), but these kinds of hand-held weapons were a threat to tanks on both sides. In fact, as historians like Steve Zaologa have pointed out, only a tank as reliable and easily maintained as the Sherman was capable of maintaining the rapid rates of advance which were achieved by the Allies at that time (Patton made the same argument in defence of the Sherman in 1945). Arguably, the Sherman was doing exactly what it was intended for - exploiting a breakthrough rather than engaging enemy armour. During this time, there was a reluctance to hold up Sherman deliveries by cancelling the production of 75mm tanks, so the number of 76mm-armed Shermans remained relatively low.
As German resistance stiffened in late 1944, Sherman crews began to face more Panzers. The Sherman's vulnerability was again highlighted, and this time the problem escalated. Increasing US tank losses in the run-up to the Ardennes Offensive prompted critical reports in the press, including an article in the Chicago Daily News in which an unidentified soldier observed "We knew we were licked tank for tank, but the boys went in a free-for-all, ganging up on the Tiger until they knocked him out". The Armored News reported "American tanks cannot beat Germans in open combat. The Panther and Tiger armor will repel our tank gun shells while their 75 and 88mm guns will shoot straight through our best armor." It was at this time that the "3:1" ratio began to be referred to in the press. American tankers began demanding a tank with a 90mm gun, but all that was available was the M36 Tank Destroyer, which was entering service at that time.
Tank losses during the Ardennes Offensive were heavy. The large number of 75mm-armed Shermans were again at a disadvantage against German armour (a significant proportion of which now consisted of heavily-armed self-propelled guns). These losses were difficult to make good as there was a shortage of replacement tanks. In January 1945, Hanson Baldwin (a very influential journalist who specialised in military matters) ran a series of articles in the New York Times highlighting the Sherman's inferiority to German armour. In March 1945 no less a personage than General Patton responded. He claimed that American units had knocked out twice as many enemy tanks as they had lost, and was highly critical of German armour. While he ignored many of the real issues (such as the Sherman's poor anti-tank capability), he made some good arguments in favour of the Sherman's reliability and availability. Behind the scenes, he had been aware of the Sherman's shortcomings - in particular its thin armour (in 1945 he authorised the up-armouring of 3rd Army Shermans by cannibalising wrecked vehicles). However, as with Montgomery in 1944, he felt he had to defend the quality of American equipment in order to maintain morale.
In summary, the Sherman's thin armour and mediocre anti-tank capability were major disadvantages, and the 75mm Sherman was not well suited to the brutal slugging matches of the Normandy campaign. However, it performed well in other situations, and it should always be remembered that Allied tankers were well supported by air power and artillery, which gave them a significant edge at an operational level. German tanks proved almost equally vulnerable as the Sherman when used in an offensive role against well-prepared Allied forces, and normally lacked anything like the level of support enjoyed by the Allied tanks. However, when facing a Panzer (or a Panzerjaeger) with a well trained crew, the Sherman was at a significant disadvantage. In close terrain it was highly vulnerable to the powerful German anti-tank weapons, and in open terrain its thin armour was vulnerable to long-range German guns. In these situations, it was common to lose several Shermans (either destroyed or disabled) in the course of knocking out a smaller number of Panzers. It was in these situations that experience and training (as well as numbers) could tip the balance.
Note: many of the statistics and quotes in question 4 come from "The Armored Campaign in Normandy" by Stephen Napier.
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Excellent, bank that is useful.
Steve Zaloga is very shirty about the names for M10/M36 in the Osprey New Vanguard book (though it is in small print by the biographies and legal stuff.
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The five Shermans to a Panzer seems to have no real source, it seems to be based on the first accounts of Tanks after WWII, relying almost exclusively on British sources. The British preferred to let the equipment do the job and used up a lot of tanks, especially in the fighting around Caen and Operation Goodwood, where losses where indeed in the 5/1 ratio ballpark, but US troops found themselves in a very different situation.
The one example that damns that preconceived notion and tends to completely blow the mind of panzer fanboys is Arracourt, an attempt by the Germans to break Patton's Third Army by launching a massive tank offensive involving mostly Panthers. 75mm Shermans and M10's stopped them cold with relatively few losses. The Panthers who should have effortlessly rolled over those US tanks had their clocks thoroughly cleaned. This was mostly due to unfavourable conditions : attacking in misty conditions, raw untrained crews and the fact that Panther had two significant weaknesses, thin side armour which was vulnerable to both 75mm and 3-inch guns and the lack of a wide-field periscope for the gunner, who had to rely on his high magnification, narrow-view gun-sight, as a result a Panther gunner often needed 4-5 times as much time as a Sherman gunner to locate a target.
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Lots of great info , Pinky thanks Always interesting to see the historical side of our plastic toys . A very interesting discussion about this very subject has been posted on the Armorama site . US doctrine seems in part to be some of the problem . Shermans were meant to work with Infantry to take and hold ground . The Tank Destroyer units with bigger guns , were meant to engage the enemy tanks at range , like a sniper . As we all know , in the fog of war , things don't always work out as planned , and you make do with what you've got .
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Part II [still WiP]
5. Did the Sherman's gyrostabilizer provide any real combat advantage?
The Westinghouse gyrostabilizer was mounted on the left side of the main gun. The gyro system stabilized the gun in the vertical only. A hydraulic cylinder was attached to the left side of the gun cradle and also to the turret roof. When the gyro sensed that the tank was rocking up or down, it would rotate a cam that controlled a hydraulic valve allowing hydraulic fluid to flow into one end or
the other of this correcting cylinder. The movement of the piston up or down in the cylinder would gently elevate or depress the gun, and if the system was adjusted correctly, the gun would elevate or depress the same amount as the tank was rocking, and the gun would stay on target. These adjustments were critical, and difficult to make, but with an experienced gunner and loader the stabilizer allowed the tank to fire on the move.
The gyro stabilization system was therefore an advanced feature, which in theory gave the Sherman a significant potential advantage over German tanks. However, in service it proved to be complicated and failure-prone, and many crews disconnected it. It created difficulties for loaders because when it was working and the tank was traveling over rough ground, the breech would constantly bounce up and down, making it almost impossible for the loader to push a round into the breech. It was removed from Shermans in British service. Overall, it seems to have been something of a wasted opportunity, and does not appear to have been a significant factor in combat.
6. Why did it take so long to arm the Sherman with the 76mm gun? And why didn't the US Army simply adopt the 17-pdr?
7. Did improvised armour (like sandbag and spare track links) improve the Sherman's survivability?
8. How long did it take to get a Sherman from the factory into active service?
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Patrick - it might have become conventional wisdom during the bocage fighting, when advancing tanks were sitting ducks against a well-placed Panzer. And maybe the huge losses in offensives like Goodwood reinforced it (although that was mostly down to anti-tank guns).
There are other examples of Panthers taking disproportionate losses against Shermans. A lot of it was down to training - Panzer crew quality was on the decline by 1944. I also think there was a degree of overconfidence on the part of some Panther crews, perhaps as a result of swallowing too much propaganda.
Shermans were meant to work with Infantry to take and hold ground . The Tank Destroyer units with bigger guns , were meant to engage the enemy tanks at range , like a sniper . As we all know , in the fog of war , things don't always work out as planned , and you make do with what you've got .
Yet ironically, once the Panzers had been 'written down' in Normandy, the Sherman was arguably the perfect tank for the lightning advance towards Germany. Which was pretty much what they were intended for. It doesn't justify the Tank Destroyer doctrine though.
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If you look back, there was all sorts of Political BS back in the 30s with the US tank forces , the Army , IRC , want armored reconasince vehicles , but by were not allowed by Congress / law to have tanks . So they developed , a lightly armored , fast vehicle ,in essence was a very early M3 Stuart type with one or two turrets with machine guns called a " Combat Car" . See its not a tank , its a Car . It looks like a tank , built from a lot of the same parts as a tank , but its not a tank . ::) Chamberlain & Ellis touch on this in their Brit & US Tanks of WW2 book . As well the Chieftain has also disused it on his blogs on the WOT site . Politics in all countries , Russia , Germany , the UK and the USA had a part in getting men killed by failing to give the go ahead to up armor and up gun . Even in some of todays conflicts , the troops are hampered by their political masters , both in equipment and in seeing the job completed and the enemy destroyed . But that's a topic for anther forum
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You're right, but armoured warfare was still developing in WW2, and it wasn't clear what would work and what wouldn't (especially given the impact WW1 had in everyone's thinking). Of course, some learned quicker than others. Arguably the Americans were the fastest learners, while the British were the slowest.
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Steve Zaloga covers some of the US problems in the Osprey New Vanguard books on the M4, M4 76mm and the M10/36. He is particularly scathing about the first attempts at a tank destroyer.
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Arguably the Americans were the fastest learners, while the British were the slowest.
I am not sure how fair that is, the Americans had access to the British experiences and still managed to repeat a number of their mistakes.
Tank design is slightly odd as Britain needed as many tanks as it could get after Dunkirk, so new designs were left on the back burner in preference to existing designs - that can be the only reason for the production of 1.7k Covenanter tanks (only one of which was lost to enemy action - by a bomb near Canterbury).
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Arguably the Americans were the fastest learners, while the British were the slowest.
I am not sure how fair that is, the Americans had access to the British experiences and still managed to repeat a number of their mistakes.
Tank design is slightly odd as Britain needed as many tanks as it could get after Dunkirk, so new designs were left on the back burner in preference to existing designs - that can be the only reason for the production of 1.7k Covenanter tanks (only one of which was lost to enemy action - by a bomb near Canterbury).
Tank production was never a priority for the British, they concentrated on aircraft and ships. As a result tank development in the UK lacked the resources and people to handle it properly. Of course this became a moot point when the Americans began to mass produce the M4. The British then concentrated on developing better weapons like the 6 and 17lbs guns.
Zaloga gives an excellent overview of what went wrong (and sometimes right) with US tank use and doctrine in WWII in Armoured Thunderbolt.
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Tank production was never a priority for the British, they concentrated on aircraft and ships. As a result tank development in the UK lacked the resources and people to handle it properly. Of course this became a moot point when the Americans began to mass produce the M4. The British then concentrated on developing better weapons like the 6 and 17lbs guns.
Zaloga gives an excellent overview of what went wrong (and sometimes right) with US tank use and doctrine in WWII in Armoured Thunderbolt.
Do you mean pre-war?
Once the war started, and especially after Dunkirk tank production was important. The War Department certainly put the resources into it (including successfully getting tank production in Canada, and not so successfully in the USA). Whether there was the skill to handle the process is debatable.
Once M4 production ramped up, there was the idea that UK tank design and production was not relevant (see also the Grizzly). Like the current steel industry, it was thought that once gone, it would be gone for good, and that was not acceptable.
UK designs were not the main problem, there were major quality control issues.
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Part of the problem was the state of UK industry . Many factories were pre WW 1 and needed to modernize , Hard to do if your trying to manufacter war material at the same time . The US built a complete Tank Factory in 6 months outside Detroit , but they had the space , man power and they weren't getting bombed by Jerry . Another thing , there was a shortage of metal lathes capable of working steel longer than the 6pdr gun . Since they couldn't make a longer barrel ( like the Germans on the Pz IV's 75mm from L43 to L48 ) which would have been a good gun as the 6t had better armor penetration than the Sherman 75 . They re bored the 6pdr to a 75mm . Better than nothing I guess . And most Churchill units had a mix of both gun types till new lathes were purchased from the USA .
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I don't have the figures at hand, but tank production budgets pale in comparison with the money the UK spent on aircraft, ships or even tobacco products. Oddly enough the situation was very similar to that of Germany which put aircraft production and submarine production before tank production as a result tanks were only a small % of the total budget.
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Part of the problem was the state of UK industry . Many factories were pre WW 1 and needed to modernize , Hard to do if your trying to manufacter war material at the same time . The US built a complete Tank Factory in 6 months outside Detroit , but they had the space , man power and they weren't getting bombed by Jerry . Another thing , there was a shortage of metal lathes capable of working steel longer than the 6pdr gun . Since they couldn't make a longer barrel ( like the Germans on the Pz IV's 75mm from L43 to L48 ) which would have been a good gun as the 6t had better armor penetration than the Sherman 75 . They re bored the 6pdr to a 75mm . Better than nothing I guess . And most Churchill units had a mix of both gun types till new lathes were purchased from the USA .
The UK faced many logistics problems such as the fact that the country is dotted with low railroad tunnels and rail companies lacked appropriate flatbed carriages to move tanks from the factories. The US sent large numbers of carriages to remedy this problem allowing the British to make large scale transport much easier.
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I am not sure how fair that is, the Americans had access to the British experiences and still managed to repeat a number of their mistakes.
Tank design is slightly odd as Britain needed as many tanks as it could get after Dunkirk, so new designs were left on the back burner in preference to existing designs - that can be the only reason for the production of 1.7k Covenanter tanks (only one of which was lost to enemy action - by a bomb near Canterbury).
I was talking more about the use of armour than tank design. The British struggled for most of the desert war to coordinate armour and infantry, and even with massive numerical superiority at Alamein they did not demonstrate any real flair - it was basically just Montgomery's 'crumbling' approach, which involved wearing down the defences by attrition. Then they had to re-learn it all in Normandy, and interestingly it was the less experienced formations which seemed to pick it up better than the veterans. The Americans did watch the British, and learned some lessons, but of course had to learn most of it the hard way. But if you look at how quickly they rebounded from the disaster at Kasserine, there's a sense that they had more of an affinity with mechanised warfare than the British. The breakout from Normandy is another good example. While the Americans tend to take far too much credit for this, and fail to acknowledge that the British took on most of the weight of the Panzer divisions, they still showed considerable flair. And by late 1944 the best US armoured units were very effective combined arms formations.
When it came to tank design, the British were plagued by outdated doctrines, competing demands and a strange lack of urgency. Some of their better designs (like the Firefly) seem to have been a result of inspired amateurism rather than any kind of rigorous design process. Despite being able to design and produce first class aircraft, artillery, trucks and even armoured cars, their tanks were mediocre at best, and often simply rubbish. David Fletcher is particularly good at describing the weirdness that went on when it came to British tank design.
The UK faced many logistics problems such as the fact that the country is dotted with low railroad tunnels and rail companies lacked appropriate flatbed carriages to move tanks from the factories. The US sent large numbers of carriages to remedy this problem allowing the British to make large scale transport much easier.
The constraints of transporting tanks by train on the UK rail network are often cited as the reason why British tanks had turret rings which did not allow the mounting of a bigger gun. I've never been entirely convinced.
UK industry was actually better organised than German industry, and produced more tanks than the Germans did overall.
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The constraints of transporting tanks by train on the UK rail network are often cited as the reason why British tanks had turret rings which did not allow the mounting of a bigger gun. I've never been entirely convinced.
My working hypothesis (i.e. I have not actually researched it, just looked at examples and made stuff up) is that the limitation on suitable guns is that for a "Tank" at some point in the elevation of the gun a line passing along the barrel and breech will contact the turret ring, and gun needs to be mounted so that at maximum recoil the end of the breech and any equipment and fittings attached to the breech do not contact the turret ring.
For non tanks, it is acceptable to have the gun recoil entirely within the turret. leading to the common silhouette of the Challenger, Bishop and KV-2.
For tanks, you could mount the gun further forward, but that leads to issues of balance requiring counterweights on the barrel (leading to barrel droop affecting accuracy) and on the turret see the M10.
British tanks generally have the turret ring between the side plates of the hull and have a turret basket with rotating floor (I am looking at models of the Cromwell, Crusader and to some extent Matilda).
For a British tank the railway loading gauge limits the width of the tank, that width being twice the track width plus suspension, the hull side plates and the turret ring plus all the required gaps allowing movement etc.
The Sherman is a different (taller) shape due to the front drive sprocket and the requirement that the drive shaft has to pass beneath the turret basket.
Though the Sherman has a narrower hull between the tracks, there is a large amount of space above the tracks (the sponsons) that is the full width of the vehicle which would allow a larger turret ring, at maximum elevation the recoil path is within the wider space. My assumption is that the turret basket is tapered (yes I am guessing).
(http://the.shadock.free.fr/sherman_minutia/manufacturer/m4a4/m4a4_61.JPG)
This is a picture borrowed from the Shaddock site, my assumption is that it is copyright free.
This makes the turret ring about my estimated size of the Rubicon M10 turret ring.
Of course not all manufacturers of kits use the true turret ring diameter, here is a link to two pictures of a Sherman and Cromwell hull with their turrets swapped, the Cromwell model's turret ring is actually larger: http://ultravanillasmurf.blogspot.co.uk/2016/04/shermwell-1-and-shermwell-2-pictures.html
I wish they would, as it would make some conversions (Kangaroos for example) easier.
Other opinions are available ^___^.
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So the real issue with British tanks was that they insisted on putting the turret ring between the tracks, and not above it? That makes sense - I wonder why they felt so constrained.
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My guess is that the designers want to make the tanks as low as possible, the armour plate required to raise the turret higher adding to the weight. Plus it increases the height of the tank making it easier to hit.
Looking at the Sherman picture, there must be something to support the turret, to transfer the recoil from the turret to the body (ever seen the video of an Iowa class battleship firing it's guns?). I assume there is a ball or roller bearing arrangement around the circumference of the turret ring.
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If you have a turret basket , it has to fit between the hull sides as they extend 4 or 5 ft down into the hull and , on the Sherman clear the drive shaft . The T-34 and JS tanks had no basket , just crew seats hanging on the turret race ( ammo in bins on the floor ) hence the turret could be wider than the lower hull . The JS 2 shows this best IMO
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The Sherman's turret basket sat level with the top of the lower hull (i.e. the sponson floors), with an 'insert' below it. It was largely removed in the 'wet' stowage configuration. Presumably, if the Ford engine had been available when it was designed, they could have lowered the profile significantly (imagine what that would have looked like!). Most of the recoil was absorbed by the gun mount (but if you've seen film of a Sherman firing, you can see that it still rocked on its tracks).
I don't know why the British seem to have felt that the turret ring shouldn't overhang the tracks. They achieved a low profile on tanks like the Valentine and Crusader, but ended up with undergunned tanks.
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Presumably, if the Ford engine had been available when it was designed, they could have lowered the profile significantly (imagine what that would have looked like!).
I suspect it would look like a T23:
(http://the.shadock.free.fr/sherman_minutia/turret_types/bigger/T23_SN12_30103061.jpg)
From the Shaddock site, 76mm turret.
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Good spot. You can see the beginnings of the M47 hull around the engine deck.
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@Ripley, looking at some line drawings (Osprey Modelling T34/76 and T34/85), the T34/76 appears to have the outer part of the turret within the line of the lower hull. The T34/85 does appear to be outside the lower hull - some drawings show the top deck of the hull extended outwards around the circumference of the turret base, but I cannot find a picture showing the turret ring at a good angle. The hull design would allow a similar arrangement to the Sherman discussed previously.
The cutaway drawing in the T34/85 New Vanguard book notes a counterweight on the breech.
I have misfiled my only Josef Stalin tank book.
@Pinky, I think only the walls of the basket were removed for better access and to offer the hull crew an escape route through the turret.
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Good spot. You can see the beginnings of the M47 hull around the engine deck.
The T20 series also included torsion bar examples, did the M46-47 have torsion bar suspension?
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On the Other Company's M4 there are armour plates to protect the direct vision hoods.
I have found no pictures of British M4s fitted with the plates, but a couple of examples showing exposed direct vision blocks. There is a photograph of a line of tanks with side and front plates that are described as having been upgraded by the British for the US Army because the front right side plate is welded over part of the star.
Did British tanks have the plates on the hoods?
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@Pinky, I think only the walls of the basket were removed for better access and to offer the hull crew an escape route through the turret.
Most of the floor of the turret basket was removed as well, so that the loader could access the ammo bins that had been relocated to the lower hull with the introduction of 'wet' stowage. The loader walked on the top of the ammo stowage when the turret was rotated. There was still a partial floor under the gunner and commander.
The T20 series also included torsion bar examples, did the M46-47 have torsion bar suspension?
Yes, they did.
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Did British tanks have the plates on the hoods?
The Warlord M4 is a mid production vehicle, without direct vision ports. The armour plates on the 'hoods' were introduced at the same time as the other applique armour panels. They were sometimes attached over direction vision ports, but weren't specifically intended to blank them off. British M4s had these plates (and they were modified for the Firefly version).
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I vaguely remembered there being what I had assumed to be a representation of the DV block on the front of the hood. All four of my completed ones have the plates glued in place so I cannot check.
Baldwin apparently only built M4s with DV hoods.
The British Tanks in Normandy book has a number of pictures of Shermans with DV block exposed.
Here is the picture of the US Army tanks with the appliqué plate over the recognition star:
(http://the.shadock.free.fr/sherman_minutia/manufacturer/m4a1psc/m4a1_psc37.JPG)
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Originals Sherman had a direct vision slot covered by an armored panel . Also had a forward view periscope in front of the driver / MG hatch and a rotating periscope on the hatch covers . Periscopes easily removed if damaged or if using vision slot , it was in the way . IRC , they found shell splinters would penetrate slot even when closed ( same reason Panther D lost driver's visor ), so 1st , they welded the slot cover , 2nd , added the extra plates in front of driver / MG ( same time as 3 side armor plates ?" ) . Then they just cast the driver / MG hood piece without a vision slot , these pieces were pre cast and welded on the M4 type square hull . :) ( Same kind of thing with pistol port on turret , - 1st welded closed , then not even in the casting , but then they put it back ::) ) IRC the T-23 tank had the same turret race as the Sherman , they changed the gun mount , it was further forward , hence the bulging turret rear as counter weight . So it was added to Shermans and that's why some pictures mention " M4A3 76mm ( T-23 turret ) And yes after a few ::) revisions the hull became the M-26 . Lots of one off US concept / proto type tanks like this in the Brit & US Tanks of WW2 book .
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Direct vision Sherman hulls had the driver and hull m.g. hatch periscopes, but not both a forward view periscope in front of the hatches and the hatch periscopes.
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I vaguely remembered there being what I had assumed to be a representation of the DV block on the front of the hood. All four of my completed ones have the plates glued in place so I cannot check.
No, there are no vision ports.
Here is the picture of the US Army tanks with the appliqué plate over the recognition star:
Having looked through my references, it's certainly true that these armour plates on the glacis seem to have been rare on British Shermans. I could only find photos of a few that had them, and nearly all of them were Fireflies. There are also quite a few British Shermans in Normandy with direct vision ports and appliqué armour on the sides but without the plates on the glacis. Perhaps the British preferred not to fit them?
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Perhaps the British preferred not to fit them?
Or they were busy welding them on the US tanks (and getting paid for it ^___^).
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My bad , your right , direct vision and hatch periscope only . Never realized that before :-[ I wonder what else I think I know , but don't ::) I blame it on old age
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That's why these discussions are useful. There's always stuff we think we understand but don't. It happens to the experts too.
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Up until a year ago I did not realise that Shermans were so complicated. They just seem to get more complicated.
These discussions are very useful.
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Up until a year ago I did not realise that Shermans were so complicated. They just seem to get more complicated.
I hadn't realised that Shermans had so many modifications during production. Things like the pistol port being eliminated then reinstated. Nor (till I was directed to the Shadock site) did I know about features like the 'thin spot' on the turret - I'd previously thought the appliqué armour on the turret was to protect the most vulnerable part of the gun breech. I think many sources give the impression that the Sherman was relatively primitive, with its railway carriage suspension, vertical armour and WW1-vintage gun. But in many ways it was a more advanced (and better equipped) tank than its contemporaries.
I'm still working on my 'interesting facts' post, although it's become rather bloated. It's amazing how contradictory the literature can be.
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Having bought the bumper bargain box of M4A4s at Warfare, I dug out some photographs from the IWM.
http://ultravanillasmurf.blogspot.co.uk/2016/12/m4a4-sherman-v-imperial-war-museum.html
I might have some from the Tank Museum (normal museum item warnings apply).
Hood armour plates shown here:
(https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-qwLtLQFa1ro/WFwnuxu-y-I/AAAAAAAABrk/o1U9yT8rdnsjou3df7NIKu-3IQumYykxgCLcB/s1600/IMG_8584.JPG)
A recent addition to my library is Sherman Tanks British Army and Royal Marines-Normandy Campaign 1944 by Dennis Oliver published by Pen and Sword 2016.
It includes a list of who had what Shermans on strength for June 1944.
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Is the Dennis Oliver book good? I've been waiting for it to be released.
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I have never read any of Mr Oliver's previous work and unlike the Osprey books there is no mini-biography.
The book is 64 pages plus covers.
There are a number of photographs in the book that I do not have in other books (including a third photograph of Brigadier Harvey's tank, though not showing the Panzerschreck box on the right mudguard).
The colour section (12 pages) is informative and back references the photographs.
The model photograph pages (10) are less useful and the supplier pages (10) (with the exception of Company B decals) do not cover 1/56 scale.
!Edit: I noticed the S and S Firefly conversion today, sorry!
The three page Normandy timeline feels a bit like padding, a simple map would have sufficed.
The text is informative, and the who had what table is the first I have seen.
From the book my Sherman I tanks were not part of second Armoured Battalion Coldstream Guards and even if they were, they would not have had squadron markings, using a continuous numbering scheme. The latter appears to contradict British Tanks in Normandy (or at least how I had read it).
Overall the book is good, but I would suggest you have a look first before you buy.
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I bought this book. I think it's a bit underwhelming. Not many new photos, and the text tends to rehearse British Tanks in Normandy - I wish he'd focused on the tanks themselves and not the units they were in. But the artwork is useful and the modelling section has some lovely Sherman models. There's also a good 'how to spot a Sherman' guide.